Wednesday, November 17, 2004

Condi and the 9/11 Commission

As you’re well aware, Condoleeza Rice has been named to replace Colin Powell and National Security Advisor. In case anyone forgot, it’s time for a quick look at her exchange with the 9/11 Commission. First, the infamous Presidential Daily Briefing of August 6, 2001.

PRESIDENTIAL BRIEFING, 8/6/01: (paragraph 7) Al Qaeda members—including some who are U.S. citizens—have resided in or traveled to the U.S. for years, and the group apparently maintains a support structure that could aid attacks….

(8) A clandestine source said in 1998 that a bin Laden cell in New York was recruiting Muslim-American youth for attacks.

(9) We have not been able to corroborate some of the more sensational threat reporting, such as that from a [REDACTED] service in 1998 saying that bin Laden wanted to hijack a U.S. aircraft to gain the release of “Blind Sheik” Omar Abdel Rahman and other U.S.-held extremists.

(10) Nevertheless, FBI information since that time indicates patterns of suspicious activity in this country consistent with preparations for hijackings or other types of attacks, including recent surveillance of federal buildings in New York.

(11) The FBI is conducting approximately 70 full field investigations throughout the U.S. that it considers bin Laden-related. CIA and the FBI are investigating a call to our embassy in the UAE in May saying that a group of bin Laden supporters was in the US planning attacks with explosives.

Now, here’s Condoleeza’s testimony, under oath, to the 9/11 Commission.

RICE, OPENING STATEMENT: I want to address in some detail one of the briefing items we received, since its content has frequently been mischaracterized.

On August 6, 2001, the president’s intelligence briefing included a response to questions that he had earlier raised about any al Qaeda intentions to strike our homeland.

The [PDB] reviewed past intelligence reporting, mostly dating from the 1990s, regarding possible al Qaeda plans to attack inside the United States. It referred to uncorroborated reporting that—from 1998—that a terrorist might attempt to hijack a U.S. aircraft in an attempt to blackmail the government into releasing U.S.-held terrorists who had participated in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. This briefing item was not prompted by any specific threat information and it did not raise the possibility that terrorists might use airplanes as missiles.

And here are selected exchanges with Richard Ben-Veniste, the head of the 9/11 Commission.

BEN-VENISTE: Isn’t it a fact, Dr. Rice, that the August 6th PDB warned against possible attacks in this country? And I ask you whether you recall the title of that PDB.

RICE: You said, did it not warn of attacks? It did not warn of attacks inside the United States. It was historical information based on old reporting. There was no new threat information, and it did not, in fact, warn of any coming attacks inside the United States.

BEN-VENISTE: As of the August 6th briefing, you learned that al Qaeda members have resided or traveled to the United States for years and maintained a support system in the United States. And you learned that FBI information since the 1998 blind sheik warning of hijackings to free the blind sheik indicated a pattern of suspicious activity in the country, up until August 6th, consistent with preparation for hijackings. Isn’t that so?

RICE: You have other questions that you want me to answer in—as part of the sequence?

BEN-VENISTE: You have indicated here that this was some historical document. And I am asking you whether it is not the case that you learned in the PDB memo of August 6th that the FBI was saying that it had information suggesting that preparations—not historically, but ongoing, along with these numerous full-field investigations against al Qaeda cells—that preparations were being made consistent with hijackings within the United States.

RICE: May I address the question, sir? The fact is that this August 6th PDB was in response to the president’s questions about whether or not something might happen or something might be planned by al Qaeda inside the United States. He asked because all of the threat reporting, or the threat reporting that was actionable, was about the threats abroad, not about the United States.

This particular PDB had a long section on what bin Laden had wanted to do—speculative, much of it—in ’97, ’98, that he had in fact liked the results of the 1993 bombing. It had a number of discussions of—it had a discussion of whether or not they might use hijacking to try and free a prisoner who was being held in the United States, Ressam. It reported that the FBI had full field investigations underway. And we checked on the issue of whether or not there was something going on with surveillance of buildings, and we were told, I believe, that the issue was the courthouse in which this might take place.

Commissioner, this was not a warning. This was a historic memo—historical memo prepared by the agency because the president was asking questions about what we knew about the inside.

Now, it should be obvious to anyone reading that Dr. Rice, for all intents and purposes, lied to the 9/11 Commission under oath. While the PDB of August 6, 2001 didn’t warn directly of an upcoming attempt by Al-Qaeda to crash an airplane into the World Trade Centre, it certainly is a “warning” of an upcoming attack, despite protestations from Rice. Read paragraphs 9 and 10 again, if you want. They warn about “bin Laden wanting to hijack U.S. aircraft”, “activity consistent with preparations for a hijacking” and “surveillance of federal buildings in New York.” In hindsight it’s possibly easier to put together than it was at that point.

However, the testimony of Dr. Rice seems like an attempt to cover up the cavalier way the Bush Administration had viewed the memo. It certain does warn of upcoming attacks in the United States, and though no one could have guessed their severity at that point, the Bush Administration knew Al Qaeda was planning something. The Bush Administration could have done a far better job in handling Al Qaeda, like I’m sure Clinton’s could have, too.

The resignation of the moderate Colin Powell and the appointment of another ideologue in Dr. Rice is not good news. Alternatively, it might be great news depending on how you view the world.

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